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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN OIL AND GAS LAW
IN ARKANSAS

Thomas A. Daily

Rece nt De v el op ments in Na t ur a l Reso ur c es Law Circa 2005
By Thomas A. Daily1

T he Midd l e Atoka Inc r ea sed Densit y Pl a n Bec o mes Cl ea r
For g et Abo ut Unit Sub divisio ns
In 2002, the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission issued a couple of landmark orders
recognizing that some Arkoma Basin gas wells are incapable of draining their 640 acre
units. Those orders mostly involved gas fields on the south flank of the Arkoma which are
underlain by discontinuous and thrust-busted middle Atokan sand packages. The 2002
solution, to which this author contributed, was to divide the existing 640 acre units into "unit
subdivisions,"2 and to permit wells in each such unit subdivision, notwithstanding that
reservoir separation could not be established between wells in adjoining subdivisions.
The reason for that approach lay in the Arkansas statute in effect at that time.3 That
statute defined a “Unit" as the largest area which could be efficiently and economically
drained by a single well. The solution was imperfect. Each unit subdivision arrived with
its own well location offset requirement. Thus, it quickly became apparent that more acres
were off limits for drilling than were on. Moreover, since the existing wells were located
without regard to the new grids imposed by the subdivisions, many of them tended to
crowd the legal locations within the new subdivision boxes.
The fix was in the 2003 Arkansas Legislature. Act 276 of 2003 amended the prior
statute to delete the reference to drainage area in the definition of unit. Rather, that statute
now empowers the Commission to create units, to determine the appropriate number of

1Member, Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C., Fort Smith, Arkansas.
2160 or 80 acres in area.
3A.C.A. §15-72-303.

wells within a unit and to regulate the spacing of those wells.
With that new statutory flexibility came a better solution. Forget the boxes-withinthe-boxes. Instead, simply prescribe a minimum distance between those wells within a unit
which produce from a common source of supply.4
Expect more gas fields, particularly on the south flank of the Arkoma, to adopt rules
of this nature. Also expect additional reservoirs, particularly U pper Atokan, and shales, to
be added.

Ar k a nsa s Co ur t Disso l ves Inj unc tio n
Res tra ining Sur f a c e Rest o r a t io n Pen den t Lit e
A group of surface owners sued virtually every oil company which had ever owned
interests in the wells on their lands, alleging surface contamination.

The defendants

quickly sought to enter the land and restore the surface, including plugging wells and
closing pits. The surface owners refused them access. The circuit judge in the case then
issued a restraining order, enjoining the restoration "to prevent irreparable harm" (the
destruction of evidence.)

After several years mired in the litigation, and a couple of

unsuccessful efforts to secure a modification of the injunction, the oil companies appealed
to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which dissolved the circuit court’s restraining order.5
There is much to like about the Court’s opinion. It states that the surface owner’s
real entitlement is to have his land restored, not to receive a verdict in a lawsuit. Surface
restoration is the strong public policy of the state of Arkansas. Even if the restraining order
was justified at the beginning, the Plaintiffs had plenty of time to find and preserve their

4That distance has been set at 560 feet in Waveland, Booneville, Chismville and
Mansfield Fields and 750 feet in Gragg Field.

5AJ& K Operating Company v. Smith, 355 Ark. 510, 140 S.W.3d 475 (2003).
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evidence.

Ar k a nsa s Sup r eme Co ur t Ho l ds Pr esumpti o n T ha t Indemnif ic a t io n
Agreem ent do es no t Appl y t o Ac t s o r Omissio ns o f Ind emnif ied Pa r t y
is Ina ppl ic a bl e t o Sur f a c e Rest o r a t io n Lia bil it y
There is a completely logical presumption that is used in the judicial construction of
an indemnification agreement.

Unless the agreement provides so explicitly, a party

presumed to not be indemnified from his o w n acts o r omissions. However, in a March
2004 decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that presumption to be inapplicable to
the indemnified party’s duty to conduct well site surface restoration.6
Chevron sold producing properties to Murphy, which then sold them to Merit Energy.
Both of those contracts required the buyers to indemnify the sellers against all claims
relating to the wells which were asserted after the sale date. The surface owners sued
Merit and others, including Chevron, alleging surface contamination. Chevron then sued
Murphy for a declaratory judgement that Murphy was required to indemnify Chevron.
Murphy defended that the indemnification agreement did not expressly state in clear and
unequivocal terms that Murphy was to indemnify Chevron for liability that Chevron may
have caused to the tract. The circuit court ruled for Murphy, relying upon the presumption
against an agreement indemnifying a party against his own fault.
The Supreme Court reversed.

It held that since the duty to restore surface is

implied by law as a duty of the current working interest owner,7 it is logical to assume that
it was considered and assumed by the purchaser of the lease. The appellate court also

6Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Murphy Exploration and Production C om pany,___ Ark.
___, ___ S .W .3 d ____, (2005).

7Bonds v. Sanchez-O’Brien Oil & Gas Co., 289 Ark. 582, 715 S.W.2d 444 (1986).
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gave Murphy indemnification from Merit.
The court’s ruling is pragmatic. There is a strong public policy favoring restoration
of well sites. The current operator is there, on-site, presumably reaping benefits from the
well. Placing the primary liability on the current operator is thus more likely to result in the
restoration taking place.

Ar k a nsa s Supreme Court App lies Acc ret ion
Ow ner sh ip Rul es to Lea seho l d Working Inte re st
Swaim v. Stephens Production Company8 is an accretion case involving a stretch
of the Arkansas River which has emerged as dry land. Pursuant to statute,9 the state quitclaimed the emerged lands to the appurtenant riparian owners, including Swaim.
The State’s riverbed lease called for a 1/8 royalty.

Swaim’s lease had been

amended to increase his royalty to 3/16. The question presented was one which all parties
acknowledged had never been answered in a reported decision: which of those leases
applies to the emerged land. Clearly the only question presented was one of law. Both
parties moved

for summary judgment.

The Circuit Court agreed with the lessee,

Stephens, that the state lease, with its 1/8 royalty, continued to apply to the former
riverbed. The Supreme Court reversed, granting summary judgment, and an extra 1/16
royalty, to Swaim.
The dilemma presented to working interest owners is that under the court’s ruling,
ownership of existing wells can change with accretion, even to the extent of putting an
owner in the well, who was formerly a working interest owner or unleased mineral owner

8___ A rk .___ , ___ S .W .3 d ___ (2004).
9A.C.A. §22-5-404.
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in an adjoining unit.
In defense of the opinion there is no perfect way to deal with accretions. This is just
another example of that. Luckily the Corps of Engineers has pretty much stabilized the
Arkansas River, so this kind of case is not likely to often reoccur.

Yo ur Humbl e Aut ho r is Al a r med by Lo o se
La ng ua g e in Otherwise Munda ne Ca se
Rigsby v. Rigsby10 is, for the most part, a very ordinary estoppel case. It involved
a father, Harold Rigsby, and his Son, Brett Rigsby. Brett convinced the circuit court that
he had relied to his detriment upon Harold’s promise to give him a one-half interest (in
partnership) in Harold’s farm for working there and contributing to payment of the mortgage
debt. The circuit court included a one-half interest in the oil and gas under the property in
computing Brett’s share.
Harold had argued that there was no evidence of estoppel with regard to the mineral
interest. Moreover, he advanced a rather unique “severance” theory. He contended that
the combination of his earlier oil and gas lease of the land to Hogback Exploration
Company, and the payment of substantial royalties by Hogback to Harold had “severed”
the mineral interest from the surface and, thus, Brett did not acquire any mineral interest
by virtue of the estoppel.
Sadly, the four members of the court who joined in the majority opinion did not reject
that "severance" theory. Rather, the majority ruled that the trial court had not ruled upon
the theory and it thus was not properly presented for appeal. Even more remarkable, and

10___ A rk .___ , ___ S .W .3d____(2004).
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pretty disturbing, is the fact that the three dissenting justices11 would have ruled that the
lease and payment of royalties effected a “severance” of the minerals.
Does that mean that these justices would rule that some other conveyance of lands
which are subject to a royalty-paying lease and which fails to mention minerals conveys
only surface? This author hopes not, but is a little concerned.

Fif t h Circu it Hold s t hat R ea so na bl e Po s t -Pr od uct io n
Co st s a r e Propor tio na tel y Deduc t ible Fr o m Roy alty
In T exa s , Even W hen Con t ra c t is w it h a n Af fi l ia t e
In 1997, an operator, MC Panhandle, entered into a gas sales agreement with
MidCon Gas Services, a subsidiary of MC Panhandle. Both were then subsidiaries of
Occidental. Shortly thereafter, Occidental reorganized those companies so that, while they
remained affiliated entities, MidCon was no longer a subsidiary of MC Panhandle.
Effective March 3,1998, Chesapeake purchased MC Panhandle. Chesapeake did not buy
MidCon.
In April 1998, MidCon began deducting gathering and transportation fees, pursuant
to a provision in the 1977 contract (which apparently was not enforced when the seller was
its parent company.) Chesapeake passed a proportionate share of those fees through to
the royalty owners who sued, contending that the deductions breached their leases. The
District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgm ent for the royalty
owners. It ruled that, because the gas sales agreement was originally entered into by
affiliates, which, at the time, had identical management and ownership, it was a sham
transaction, as a matter of law.

11Justice Corbin wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Brown
and Thornton.
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The Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit reversed.12 The mere fact that contracting
parties are affiliates does not establish that the contract a sham. Rather, the contract’s
terms should be compared to terms in similar agreements between arm’s-length parties
to determine whether it is a reasonable agreement.

Thr ee Recent Repo r t ed Ca ses Appl y Da u b e r t Test
to “Ex pe r t ” Test imo ny in Oil a nd Ga s Ca ses
in his excellent article prepared for the 2001 Arkansas Natural Resources Law
Institute,13 E. R. Norwood provided us with an excellent discussion of the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Daubert and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd v. Patrick

Carmichael e t al.14 That case requires the trial court to serve as a gatekeeper for
determining the admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases by determining whether the
testimony is relevant and has a reliable basis in the witness’s knowledge and experience
in the relevant discipline. Three 2004 cases, from Oklahoma, Texas and Louisiana, make
it clear that state courts will apply the Daubert test to alleged oil and gas experts.

O klah oma Appea l s Co ur t Rul es tha t the Right t o
Infl at io n -Adjust Over hea d Ra t es is Lost if not Exe rcised Per mits a n “Experi enc ed Opera to r ” to T estify a s
Expert o n Indus tr y Cust o m Under Da u b e r t St a nda r d
Oneok Resources Company was the operator of several unit wells pursuant to an
AAPL JOA and attached COPAS. The COPAS permits the monthly per-well overhead
rate to be increased, annually in April, based upon increases in a government index tied

2004).

12Ramming v. Natural Gas Pipeline Company of Am erica, ___ F .3 d ____(5th Cir.

13Exper t T est imon y - G eolo gy a nd Reser vo ir En g in e e r in g : At T r ia l a nd
Administ r a t ive Hea rings .
14526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167. 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999).
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to earnings of oil and gas field production workers. However, Oneok and its predecessor
operator did not increase these overhead rates for several years. When Oneok realized
this it sought to increase the rates to a level which would be attained if all previous
increases had occurred.

The non-operators sued, contending that Oneok could only

increase the overhead rates in comparison the those rates in effect immediately prior to
the increase.
The trial court permitted the non-operators to call a witness named Agee. Agee had
a Ph.D. in economics but was not a member of COPAS, nor was he an accountant or
auditor. Rather, he was an operator of wells and the founder of XAE Corporation. He
testified that industry custom followed the non-operators’ interpretation of the admittedly
ambiguous COPAS provision.
On appeal Oneok challenge the trial court’s refusal to sustain a Daubert challenge
to Agee’s expert witness qualifications. Applying what it said was the Daubert standard,
the Appeals Court held that Agee was entitled to express his opinions upon industry
customs and practices,15

Texa s Supre me Co u r t , Appl ying Da u b e r t , Rev er ses V er dic t
Bec a use Petroleum Eng ineer W it ness w a s Perm itt ed t o Expr ess
Co nc l usio n a s to Dr a ina g e Da ma g es W ith ou t Adeq ua te Fo unda t io n
In an "implied covenant to prevent drainage”16 case the royalty owner plaintiffs were
allowed to present the testimony of a petroleum engineer named Michael Riley. Riley
constructed an economic model which assumed, without any scientific foundation that a

15Stephenson v. Oneok Resources Company, 2004 Ok. Civ. App. 8 1 ,___ P.3d
, (2004).
l6Kerr-McGee Corporation , et. al. v. Helton , 133 S.W.3d 245 (Tex. 2004)
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hypothetical well, "timely" drilled upon the Plaintiffs’ tract would have produced at exactly
the same rates as the alleged draining wells during the time period in question. The Texas
Supreme Court reversed a substantial jury verdict for the Plaintiffs by disallowing Riley’s
testimony as failing to meet the Daubert17 standard. The court agreed that engineering
testimony can be used to create a model of the reservoir and predict the performance of
a hypothetical well. Indeed, that i s what petroleum engineers d o . However, that is not
what Riley did in this case. He merely assumed, without scientific basis, some hypothetical
production volumes which he then multiplied by dollars to reach a damage opinion
supportive of the Plaintiffs.

Loui sia na Court o f Appea l Appl ies Da ube rt - Al l o w s “Indus try
Ex pe r t ” t o Te st ify a s t o Da ma g es f o r Fai lur e t o Rel ea se Lea se
A third jurisdiction to apply Daubert18 in an oil and gas case was Louisiana.

Chesapeake Operating Inc. v. Richardson19was a case in which the lessee, Chesapeake,
failed to timely exercise its option to extend the primary term of Richardson’s lease and
then refused to release the lease. Instead, Chesapeake sued for a declaratory judgment
that it should be forgiven its untimely exercise of the renewal option because it was the
result of “good faith mistake", "inadvertence and oversight.” The facts were proven by
Richardson to be otherwise. Richardson proved that Chesapeake failed to renew his lease
because it was waiting and watching development in the area, before deciding what leases

17Supra.
18Supra.
19___ S o .__ , ___ (2004).
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to renew.
Chesapeake successfully challenged Richardson’s expert witness, Guy Ellison, an
“expert in oil and gas leasing in the Austin Chalk trend,” on the basis of Daubert. On
appeal the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed. That court held that Ellison
should have been allowed to testify that there was demand for leases in the vicinity on the
day that the primary lease term expired, and that subsequent unsuccessful drilling
operations caused that demand to evaporate before Chesapeake actually released
Richardson’s lease. The appeal court rejected Chesapeake’s contention that Richardson
was required to prove that he missed an actual, specific opportunity to lease.

O kl ah oma Sup r e me Co ur t Disting uishes Bet w een T he o r ies o f
Impl ied Covena nt to Ma r k et a nd Cessa t io n o f Pro duc t io n in Pa ying
Qua nt it ies - L esso r ’s Dema nd no t Req uire d in t he Lat t er Type o f Ca se
In Smith v. Marshall Oil Corporation20 Smith, the former operator sought to quiet title
to certain wells which he had operated as well as equipment left on site. Marshall had
obtained new leases from Smith’s Lessor. Smith contended that Marshall and the lessor
were barred from suing for cancellation of the leases since there had never been demand
made for Smith to comply with the implied covenant to market oil or gas from the wells.
However, the court was unimpressed with Sm ith’s argument, holding, instead, that the
wells had failed to produce in paying quantities and, thus, no demand was required.
Marshall contended that the wells were incapable of producing in paying quantities
until Marshall took over and reworked the wells. Smith claimed otherwise but the trial court
held, as a matter of fact, for Marshall on that issue. It was undisputed that the revenue
from the wells was far less than operating expenses. However, Oklahoma law does permit

2084 P.3d 830 (Ok. 2004).
Page 10

a lease to continue, although production is at a loss, for “equitable considerations.” The
Supreme Court found Smith to be devoid of those.

Indeed, the court termed Smith’s

admitted behavior: “I produced them when I felt like producing them. And I turned them
off when I felt like turning them o ff’, “conduct...unacceptable for an operator in the state of
Oklahoma.”

Texa s Cou rt o f Appea l s Enf o r c es Mai nt ena nc e o f Unif or m Inte re st
Cl a use -H o l ds W el l Pr o po sa l by Farm -ou te e Inva l id a nd Hold s Fa r m-o ut o r
Lia bl e f o r No n -Co ns ent Pena l t y
For years, industry professionals in the Arkoma Basin have given and gotten
borehole farm-out agreements, notwithstanding that such agreements are in direct violation
of the “Maintanance of Uniform Interest” provision of most JOA’s. We have heard various
theories why that was not a problem. One of those was that the clause was not specifically
enforceable and thus, other parties to the JOA would have to prove damage from its
violation. That is precisely what happened in a recent Texas Appeals Court case, Exxon

Mobil Corporation v. Valence Operating Company,21 In that case Texas’ First District Court
of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s award of damages equal to the non-consent penalties
which Valence suffered when it ignored well proposals made by Exxon Mobil’s farm-outee.
It seems a little disingenuous to conclude that the Farm-outee's well proposals were
invalid and, at the same time to charge anyone with the non-consent penalties resulting
from those invalid proposals, but that is what appears to have happened. Also, can we just
assume that the wells drilled under the illegal farm-outs will ever be good enough to
recover those penalties? The case does not appear to be well reasoned at ail, regardless

21___ P .3d____(Tex. App. 2004).
Page 11

of how you feel about Maintenance of Uniform interest.
This marks the second recent case out of a major oil and gas producing jurisdiction
honoring the Maintenance of Uniform Interest provision22 and, if upheld, invites a pretty
frightening method for enforcing the clause with damages. Exxon Mobil has petitioned for
rehearing. Ultimately, the case may well go to the Texas Supreme Court. We will continue
to watch it. Stay tuned.

It ’s Ano t he r o ne o f T hem Odd Yea r s , Z ee k ,
The Legislature ’s o n t he Lo o se
In Arkansas, “odd” years are made a bit odder by the biannual phenomenon known
as the “Regular Session of the General Assembly.” Picture citizen legislators from the hills
and swamps descending upon the state capital, each with a mission: to fix, by hook or
crook, every perceived injustice done recently to any of their constituents and, in the
process, advance the combined agendas of the NRA, MADD and last Sunday’s fire and
brimstone sermon at Third Reformed Antioch Pentecostal Free W ill. It usually is a pretty
scary sight, and 2005 will be no exception, although the follies have just begun.
Here are the texts of bills introduced or under consideration for introduction as of
February 15. These have been ranked according to the standard system as Good, Maybe

Good, Bad and Absolutely Awful. Things change instantly in the Legislature. Therefore,
our oral presentation may or may not vaguely resemble these bills. Nevertheless, here
goes:

22The other being Pitco v. Chaparral, 2003 Ok. 5, 63 P.3d 531 (2003).
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GOOD
Stricken language would be deleted from and underlined language would be added to the law as it existed
prior to this session of the General Assembly.

1
2

3

4

5
6

A Bill

State of Arkansas
85th General Assembly
Regular Session, 2005

HOUSE BILL 1224

By: Representative Maloch
By: Senators
Horn, G. Jeffress

7

8

For An Act To Be Entitled

9
10

AN ACT TO AMEND § 15-72-102 TO DEFINE OPERATOR;

11

TO AMEND § 15-72-303 TO ALLOW AN OPERATOR TO

12

APPLY FOR AN ORDER TO INTEGRATE THE INTERESTS OF

13

OWNERS IN A DRILLING UNIT; AND FOR OTHER

14

PURPOSES.

15

Subtitle

16
17

AN ACT TO DEFINE OPERATOR AND TO ALLOW

18

AN OPERATOR TO APPLY FOR AN ORDER TO

19

INTEGRATE THE INTERESTS OF OWNERS IN A

20

DRILLING UNIT.

21

22
23

BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS:

24
25

SECTION 1.

26

15-72-102. Definitions.

27

As used In this act, unless the context otherwise requires:

28
29
30

Arkansas Code § 15-72-102 is amended to read as follows:

(1)

"Commission" means the Oil and Gas Commission as created by

(2)

"Person" means any natural person, corporation, association,

this act;

31

partnership, receiver, trustee, guardian, executor, administrator, fiduciary,

32

federal agency, or representative of any kind;

33

(3)

"Oil" means crude petroleum oil, and other hydrocarbons,

34

regardless of gravity, which are produced at the well in liquid form by

35

ordinary production methods and which are not the result of condensation of

36

gas after it leaves the reservoir;
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